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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROBLEMS IN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES-EXERCISES IN
PRIVITY, SYMMETRY, AND REPOSE
OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR.*
As the law of civil liability for defective products has developed, it has
presented prospective plaintiffs with three principal theories by which they
may seek recovery: negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability in tort.'
In selecting a theory, plaintiffs will often want to consider, among other
factors, the limitation period on bringing an action under each possibility;
but the plaintiff will also have to face many unsettled limitations questions
in making the selection. This is particularly true when choosing between breach
of warranty and strict liability in tort.2 This article will discuss those questions.
Statute of Limitations in Torts
The greatest agreement in this area is found as to the applicable statute
of limitations for products liability actions based on negligence or on strict
liability in tort. The relevant statute on tort actions will govern, not the statute
on contract or breach of warranty claims. 3 Thus, in Anderson v. Fairchild
Hiller Corp.,; the plaintiff sued under a strict liability in tort theory after
being injured by the rotor blade of a helicopter manufactured by the defen-
dant. The federal court applied Alaska's two-year statute of limitations on
personal injury claims, giving two reasons for choosing this statute over the
one applicable to warranty claims. First, although strict liability for defective
products may have originated in warranty theory, breach of warranty was
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. The author expresses appreciation to his
research assistant, Monte Wilson.-Ed.
1. See W. Prossmt & R. KaTON, TORTS 694 (5th ed. 1984). See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d
101 (1973); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057 (1967). In two jurisdictions-Delaware and Massachusetts-
the Uniform Commercial Code's warranty provisions will ordinarily offer the only remedy in
a products liability case, precluding any tort recovery. See Cline v. Prowler Indus., 418 A.2d
968 (Del. 1980); Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633, 378 N.E.2d 964 (1978); Swartz v. General
Motors Corp., 375 Mass. 628, 378 N.E.2d 61 (1978). See generally Braden v. Hendricks, 695
P.2d 1343, 1351 (Okla. 1985).
2. See McNichols, The Kirkland v. General Motors Manufacturers' Products Liability
Doctrine- What's in a Name?, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 347, 368-77 (1974). See generally Symposium,
Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 62 (1970). There are usually
no particular problems involving the statute of limitations in products cases based on negligence.
Therefore, this article will concentrate on the warranty and strict tort theories.
3. See Annot., 91 A.L.R.3d 455 (1979). See generally Comment, The Statute of Limitations
in Strict Product Liability Actions, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 477 (1975); Note, Products Liability-
Statute of Limitations-Tort Statute of Limitations Applied in Strict Products Liability Actions,
43 FoRDH i L. REv. 322 (1974).
4. 358 F. Supp. 976 (D. Alaska 1973).
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itself originally a form of fraud, sounding in tort, and the tort statute was
thus appropriate. Second, in its present form, strict liability in tort is closer
to negligence than to warranty because no contract is required and liability
generally cannot be disclaimed. Other courts have given similar reasons. An
Arizona case applied the tort statute on "injuries to the person" to a plain-
tiff in a strict liability action, noting that privity of contract is not required
and that the tort statute is therefore more appropriate than the contract statute.s
Perhaps the most cited case on the question of the applicable statute of
limitations in strict-tort liability cases is Victorson v. Bock Laundry Machine
Co.,' a New York opinion overruling earlier authority.7 The statute covering
actions for personal injury and property damage was held to be the relevant
one. The court observed that strict tort liability does not arise from the will
or intention of the parties but is based on considerations of social policy and
may extend to those, such as innocent bystanders, having no contractual deal-
ings with the manufacturer or other defendants. Thus, the court concluded
that because the action sounded in tort it should be governed by the same
limitation period as applies to negligence actions. This holding has been dis-
cussed and followed in later New York cases.' Similar reasoning is found in
a Vermont case that observed that if the absence of a contractual relationship
between the parties does not bar recovery in strict tort liability, it is difficult
to understand how the liability can be considered contractual in nature.9 The
action was also said to sound in tort. However, the Vermont court added
that the applicable statute should be determined by the nature of the injury
(here, personal injury), not the legal theory used in stating the claim. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court has similarly regarded strict liability in tort as being
independent of contract and thus governed by the tort statute of limitations.10
5. Wetzel v. Commercial Chair Co., 18 Ariz. App. 54, 500 P.2d 314 (1972).
6. 37 N.Y.2d 395, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 335 N.E.2d 275 (1975), noted 40 ALD. L. REv. 869
(1976). See LaSalle, Products Liability: Tort or Contract-A Resolution of the Conflict? 21
N.Y.L.F. 587 (1976).
7. Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 253 N.E.2d
207 (1969), where the court had treated strict liability in tort and breach of implied warranty
as merely different ways of designating the same cause of action and had held that an action
predicated on either theory would be governed by New York's six-year statute of limitations
for contract actions, not the three-year statute for torts. See O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 335 F.
Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), a federal case applying the Mendel rule.
8. See, e.g., Ribley v. Harsco Corp., 57 A.D.2d 234, 394 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. 1977);
Murphy v. General Motors Corp., 55 A.D.2d 486, 391 N.Y.S.2d 24 (Sup. Ct. 1977). Some authority
even prior to Victorson had applied the three-year tort statute to strict tort claims. See Simmons
v. Albany Boys Club, Inc., 80 Misc. 2d 19, 362 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Lewis v. John
Royle & Sons, 79 Misc. 2d 304, 357 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. 1974), aff'd on other grounds,
46 A.D.2d 304, 362 N.Y.S.2d 262 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
9. Kinney v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 134 Vt. 571, 367 A.2d 677 (1976).
10. Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306 (Okla. 1975); O'Neal v. Black & Decker Mfg.
Co., 523 P.2d 614 (Okla. 1974); Moss v. Polyco, Inc., 522 P.2d 622 (Okla. 1974); Kirkland
v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974). See Nichols v. Eli Lilly & Co., 501 F.2d
392 (10th Cir. 1974).
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Also, the Connecticut Supreme Court has concluded that such strict liability
claims must be classified as among those "founded upon a tort. '""
Many cases involving strict tort liability for defective products have sum-
marily concluded that the general tort statute or some more specific tort statute
will apply. For example, one Minnesota case involved a plaintiff who alleged
that asbestos insulation manufactured by the defendant was unreasonably
dangerous and had caused him to develop asbestosis.' 2 The court stated without
explanation that the statutory period on personal injury actions would apply. 3
The strict liability claim is often combined with claims based on negligence
or other tort theories, and the court may be influenced in applying the tort
statute by a desire to treat all the counts similarly.1 ' Indeed, a court may
neglect to state what the theory of the action is, even when it appears to be
strict liability in tort, and instead emphasize the nature of the harm suffered,
for example, personal injury or property damage.'" On the other hand, some
opinions have stressed the tort nature of the strict liability theory and con-
cluded on that basis that the statutory period should be the same as for
negligence.' 6 Similarly, when the injury sued on is death, courts may tend
automatically to apply the limitation statute applicable to wrongful death
because it is apparently most specifically on point.' 7
The chief argument against the application of the relevant tort statute is
that strict tort liability should be treated like breach of warranty and should
therefore be subject to the Uniform Commercial Code's limitation period,
which is four years.' 8 This contention, however, has been almost universally
11. Prokolkin v. General Motors Corp., 170 Conn. 289, 365 A.2d 1180 (1976) (strict liability
claim held barred by statute of limitations on tort actions). Accord, Abate v. Barkers of Wall-
ingford, Inc., 27 Conn. Supp. 46, 229 A.2d 366 (1967). Cf. Hornung v. Richardson-Merill, Inc.,
317 F. Supp. 183 (D. Mont. 1970) (finding that under Montana law a strict tort claim was governed
by the statute applicable to actions based on a liability other than contract).
12. Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975) (applying Minnesota
law).
13. Accord, Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 412 F. Supp. 1392 (D.N.H. 1976) (New Hampshire
law); Nelson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1120 (D.N.H. 1970) (same); Tucker
v. Capital Mach., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 291 (M.D. Pa. 1969) (Pennsylvania law); G.D. Searle &
Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975); Williams v. Brown Mfg.
Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970). All of these cases apply the statute relating to per-
sonal injuries, with little or no discussion.
14. See Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973).
15. See Roman v. A.H. Robins Co., 518 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1975); Chicago & So. Airlines,
Inc. v. Volpar, Inc., 54 II1. App. 3d 609, 370 N.E.2d 54 (1977). Cf. Kinney v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 134 Vt. 571, 367 A.2d 677 (1976) (finding that the action sounded in tort but
concluding that even if it did not, the nature of the injury sustained, not the legal theory of
the claim, should determine the applicable statute of limitations).
16. See Arrow Transp. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 289 F. Supp. 170 (D. Or. 1968) (Oregon
law); O'Neal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 523 P.2d 614 (Okla. 1974).
17. See McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487 (Tenn. 1975); Holifield
v. Setco Indus., Inc., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969). See also as to Tennessee law,
Hargrove v. Newsome, 225 Tenn. 462, 470 S.W.2d 348 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 907 (1972)
(statute of limitations on personal injuries applicable to strict tort claim).
18. U.C.C. § 2-725 (1978). In Oklahoma, however, the period is five years. 12A OKLA. STAT.
19851
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rejected. Again, one of the best discussions is found in the Anderson case
from Alaska, 9 where the court noted that the longer Code period is intended
to apply only in favor of those who have contracted with the defendant or
otherwise satisfied the privity requirement. The court stated that this is because
a seller wants to know as soon as possible if a product is defective and causes
injuries in order that he may take steps to prevent additional injury and lia-
bility. Therefore, a longer period is given those whose identity is known or
could readily be discovered, while a shorter period is provided for those whose
identity the seller could not know until a lawsuit is filed, thus encouraging
prompt filing in the latter situations. Further, the court noted that under the
Code, the parties may contract to reduce the period from the four years or-
dinarily provided to no less than one year. The seller, however, has no op-
portunity to make such an agreement with those with whom he has not con-
tracted; therefore, it would not be appropriate to give those persons the longer
basic period. One New Jersey case emphasized that the Code limitation period
is stated to apply to actions "for breach of any contract for sale" and thus
could only apply to a suit involving two directly contracting parties or where
the plaintiff could qualify under the Code as a third-party beneficiary.20 Thus,
the Code's limitation period cannot possibly apply to all products liability
cases. In an even earlier case, the New Jersey court observed that the Code's
language indicates that the limitation period was never intended to apply to
tort actions between consumers and manufacturers who have not been in a
commercial relationship.2'
As some of the above-cited cases indicate, the argument for rejection of
the Code's limitation period is particularly strong where the parties are not
in privity. New York, for example, has stressed the lack of prior association
between the plaintiffs in a products liability action and the manufacturer they
were suing.22 The court noted that the claims were not based on any alleged
nonperformance of an agreement between the parties and that strict tort lia-
bility does not arise from or require any contractual relationship between the
parties prior to the injury. Indeed, strict tort liability was developed largely
as a means of avoiding the privity requirements traditionally associated with
breach of warranty actions,2" and strict tort liability is based, not on any con-
tractual or other relationship between the parties, but on the public policy
of making manufacturers and sellers bear the risk of their dangerously defec-
tive products.2 '
§ 2-275 (1981). A few other states have, when adopting the Uniform Commercial Code, specified
a period other than four years, usually five or six years. See Annot., 91 A.L.R.3d 455, 465 (1979).
19. Anderson v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 358 F. Supp. 976 (D. Alaska 1973).
20. Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973).
21. Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968).
22. Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 335 N.E.2d
275 (1975).
23. See Nelson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1120. (D.N.H. 1970).
24. See Cinnaminson Twnshp. Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 552 F. Supp. 855 (D.N.J.
1982) (loss could fall within ambit of property damage, rather than merely economic loss, where
defect in asbestos allegedly rendered entire ceiling useless).
[Vol. 38:667
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When Does the Tort Action Accrue?
Closely related to the question of the relevant limitation period in strict
tort liability is the issue of when the statutory period starts to run-i.e., when
does the action accrue? The general rule is usually stated that the statute runs
from the time the injury is suffered by the plaintiff. 5 The date of sale is
specifically rejected in favor of the date of the harm.26 The time at which
the injury occurred is a question of fact and, therefore, unless reasonable
people could not disagree, is an issue for the jury." Thus, in a case in which
plaintiff's hair got caught in the drive shaft of a manure spreader, the statute
started to run as of the moment of the resulting personal injury;28 and in
a situation involving an allegedly defective television set that exploded and
set fire to the plaintiff's house, the action accrued at the time of the explo-
sion. 9 Again, the courts sometimes emphasize that the rule is the same as
that applied to negligence actions. 30 Similarly, for choice-of-laws purposes,
the actions are deemed to have arisen at the place where the injury occurred. 3
While the statutory period in strict products liability, as in negligence,
generally starts to run at the time of injury, certain exceptions are sometimes
recognized. 32 The starting of the statutory period may conceivably be delayed
until (1) the plaintiff has discovered or should reasonably have discovered
his injury; (2) the plaintiff has discovered or should reasonably have discovered
the possible causal connection between the allegedly defective product and
his injury; or (3) the plaintiff has discovered or should reasonably have
discovered the identity of the potential defendant responsible for the defec-
tive product-i.e., the seller or the manufacturer. The first of these possible
reasons for delay is the one most commonly recognized: The statute will start
to run when the plaintiff's injury is capable of discovery, when it should
25. See Tyler v. R.R. Street & Co., 322 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Va. 1971). See generally Annot.,
4 A.L.R.3d 821 (1965).
26. Rivera v. Berkeley Super Wash, Inc., 44 A.D.2d 316, 354 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1974). See
McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487 (Tenn. 1975).
27. Federal Mogul Corp. v. Universal Constr. Co., 376 So. 2d 716 (Ala. App. 1979), cert.
denied, 376 So. 2d 726 (Ala. 1979).
28. Ribley v. Harsco Corp., 57 A.D.2d 234, 394 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
29. Romano v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 336 A.2d 555 (R.I. 1975).
30. See Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968); Singer v.
Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 112 Misc. 2d 781, 447 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1981) (causes of action in
negligence and in strict products liability were governed by same statute, which ran from date
of injury).
31. Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185, 374 N.E.2d 97
(1978) (negligence and strict liability causes of action against New York manufacturer of forklift
truck used in Virginia accrued in Virginia, where injury occurred). See Bruce v. Fairchild Indus.,
Inc., 413 F. Supp. 914 (W.D. Okla. 1974) (cause of action for defective plane was tortious in
origin and arose from the injury rather than the sale of aircraft; thus any Oklahoma activities
involving sale could not be used to establish Oklahoma jurisdiction over defendants).
32. See McGovern, The Status of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose in Product
Liability Actions: Present and Future, 16 FoRUM 416 (1981), with a survey of the relevant statutes
of limitations of the various states, and of the time they start to run.
1985]
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reasonably have been discovered by the plaintiff." Thus, one commentator
has observed that a consequence of a jurisdiction's adoption of strict tort
liability "could be to allow a victim injured by a defective product many years
after it was sold to recover on a 'nonnegligence' basis, provided he could
prove it was in a defective condition when sold.""4
Suits against sellers of asbestos, alleging that the asbestos produced asbestosis
in the plaintiff, have frequently led to application of the rule that the statutory
period starts to run when the plaintiff's harm was discovered, or should
reasonably have been discovered, whichever date is earlier." In such a situa-
tion, the cause of action accrues when the diagnosis is made, or at such time
as it could earlier have been made with reasonable diligence.', Similarly, where
a chemical spilled on the plaintiff initially produced no perceptible trauma
and caused only a mild rash that soon disappeared, it could be found that
the plaintiff acted with reasonable diligence even though the plaintiff did not
file suit against the chemical manufacturers until over a year after the spill,
when the serious effects of the chemical allegedly became apparent. 7 However,
there is no unanimous agreement even on this aspect of the "discovery" rule.
A Virginia case involved a suit against the manufacturers of power shovels
that the plaintiff had operated and maintained. 8 The plaintiff contended that
the location of shovel cabs and the composition of the brake and clutch linings
had combined to cause his bronchitis, asbestosis, and silicosis. The court held
that the cause of action accrued when the plaintiff contracted these condi-
tions, not when he discovered that he had them.
Even if the plaintiff is aware of his injury, he cannot very well sue unless
he has some idea of the cause of the injury. Therefore, some applications
of the "discovery" rule go farther than merely saying that the statute starts
to run when the plaintiff discovers or should reasonably discover the injury;
some courts also add that the statute will not begin to run until the plaintiff
knows or should reasonably know that the allegedly defective product caused
33. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1963); Hornung v.
Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 183 (D. Mont. 1970).
34. McNichols, supra note 2, at 369 n.94, citing Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51
N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
35. See Clutter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 646 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1981) (applying Ohio
law); Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos & Magnesia Materials Co., 74 III. App. 3d 778, 392
N.E.2d 1352 (1979), aff'd, 85 I11. 2d 161, 421 N.E.2d 864 (1981).
36, McKee v. Johns-Manville Corp., 94 Misc. 2d 327, 404 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1978).
37. Pereira v. Dow Chem. Co., 129 Cal. App. 3d 865, 181 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1982) (summary
judgment for defendants reversed).
38. Large v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 524 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Va. 1981) (applying Virginia law).
Cf. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Mich.
1978) (asbestos products manufacturer's liability for injuries to workmen due to prolonged periods
of exposure would be apportioned among all products liability insurers during total period of
exposure, under the theory that exposure rather than manifestation of disease was the occurrence
insured against; applying Illinois and New Jersey law); Wilson v. White Motor Corp., 118 Ill.
App. 2d 436, 254 N.E.2d 277 (1970) (cause of action accrues when act causing liability occurs,




STA TUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROBLEMS
the injury. In a Pennsylvania case, for example, the plaintiff claimed that
her paralysis was caused by the surgeon drilling too deeply into her cervical
vertebrae during surgical fusion. The plaintiff sued the doctors and the hospital
that had treated her."9 Those defendants in turn impleaded, under strict tort
liability, the manufacturer of the bone cutter used in the operation, pointing
to an apparent defect in the cutter. It was held that the statute began to run
against the manufacturer when the plaintiff could reasonably have discovered
that this defect caused her injury. Similarly, in a federal court case against
the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield, a contraceptive device, the court found
that the action had accrued when the plaintiff should reasonably have
discovered that she was injured by that product. 0
Will the courts go still farther and delay the start of the statute until the
plaintiff knows or should have known the identity of the prospective defen-
dant? Some courts have indicated they will go this far, as in a Kentucky
asbestosis case in which strict tort liability was asserted against the manufac-
turer of certain asbestos products.4 The court stated that the action arose
when the plaintiff discovered or could reasonably have discovered that he
had lung cancer and that it could have been caused by the defendant's pro-
duct. A federal case applying Oklahoma law included negligence and strict
liability counts against the manufacturers of clear plastic meat-wrapping film.
The plaintiff alleged that a disability was caused by breathing fumes created
by cutting the film with hot wire. 2 The court held that the action accrued
when the plaintiff should reasonably have known that she had the condition
and that the defendant caused it.
These extensions of the "discovery" rule to situations in which the plain-
tiff, though aware of his injury, could not reasonably know the cause or the
identity of the prospective defendant, seem in accord with a rule often applied
in medical malpractice cases: the statutory period starts to run when the plain-
tiff should reasonably know of his injury and the cause thereof.43 But that
rule has generally been rejected in other contexts; and in the defective pro-
duct actions, most cases have held that the statute runs despite the plaintiff's
ignorance of what or who caused his harm. Thus, in a leading California
case in which the plaintiffs alleged that they did not learn until nearly sixteen
39. Grubb v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 387 A.2d 480 (Pa. Super. 1978) (strict liability available
against hospital as supplier of surgical instrument).
40. Ballew v. A.H. Robins Co., 688 F.2d 1325 (lth Cir. 1982) (applying Georgia law).
41. Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1979). See
Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos & Magnesia Materials Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d 778, 392 N.E.2d
1352 (1979), where there is language indicating the action accrued when plaintiff discovered he
had contracted asbestosis and that this condition was due to acts or omissions of defendants,
which would entitle him to proceed against them. Cf. Perez v. Universal Eng'g Corp., 413 So.
2d 75 (Fla. App. 1982) (negligence action against manufacturer of crusher machine, from which
welders claimed to have contracted manganese poisoning, accrued when the welders were, by
exercise of reasonable diligence, put on notice as to negligent act which caused the injury).
42. Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1980) (applying Oklahoma law).
43. See Annot., 91 A.L.R.3d 991 (1979); Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 277 (1950). See generally
Annots., 1 A.L.R.4th 117 (1980); 80 A.L.R.2d 368 (1961).
19851
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months after their illness that it was peas canned by the defendant company
that had produced their illness, the court held that the statute nonetheless
ran from the time of the illness."" Ignorance that was not induced by fraud
was ruled insufficient to prevent the running of the statute, despite the plain-
tiffs' assertions that they had made diligent efforts to determine the cause
of their sickness. In a Florida case, a pilot injured in the crash of his helicopter
stated that he did not have any reason to believe he had an action against
the manufacturer of the helicopter until he received information from the
Civil Aeronautics Board about another helicopter crash. The information led
him to believe that his helicopter might have been defective.4 However, the
court held the statute ran from the time of the crash. An Illinois case held
that since the plaintiff had known of her injury-a cerebral vascular accident-
for more than the statutory period, she was barred from bringing a strict
tort action against the manufacturer of a contraceptive which had allegedly
caused this accident, even though it was not until two years after her stroke
that she learned that the defendant's drug was the cause of her condition.46
In a Texas case, lack of knowledge of the cause of the plaintiff's illness was
held not to affect the running of the statute of limitations against the manufac-
turer of a contraceptive which was claimed to have produced a blood clot
and resulting illness.
47
Most courts clearly state that if the plaintiff knows he has suffered an in-
jury or illness, there is ordinarily no reason to delay the running of the statute,
even though it is not until later that the plaintiff learns of a legally responsi-
ble cause. If a bus driver falls when trying to adjust the bus's rear-view mirror
and knows immediately of her injury from the fall, the statute starts to run
at the time of the accident, not when the driver is later advised that a defect
in the bus might have caused the fall.4' If the owner of a building finds his
roof is leaking, the statute runs from the time of discovery of the leak, not
from the time the exact cause of the leak is determined."9 In such cases, courts
sometimes say that the plaintiff knew of his right to sue at the time of the
injury, even if he did not learn until later of the possibly defective nature
of the product,"0 or did not learn until later of the causal relationship be-
tween his injury and the allegedly defective product.' Not surprisingly, these
courts also hold that the statute will run despite the plaintiff's ignorance as
44. Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (1954).
45. Beasley v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 401 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1968).
46. Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974).
47. Allen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 387 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (applying Texas
law).
48. Lofton v. General Motors Corp., 694 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying Illinois law).
49. Friends Univ. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 227 Kan. 559, 608 P.2d 936 (1980).
50. See Bates v. Little Co. of St. Mary Hosp., 108 III. App. 3d 137, 438 N.E,2d 1250 (1982).
51. See Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Co., 149 N.J. Super. 20, 372 A.2d 1355 (1977), aff'd, 76
N.J. 284, 386 A.2d 1310 (1978) (in negligence and strict liability action against manufacturer
of pipe glue, toxic fumes from which had allegedly caused the plaintiff's heart attack, the plain-
tiff knew of some toxic effect of the fumes prior to the attack and thus should have known
of possible causal link, and possible claim, when heart attack occurred).
[Vol. 38:667
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to Who actually manufactured or sold the product that caused the injury, as
where a home water heater explodes and burns the plaintiff's house, and plain-
tiff does not determine until some time later the identity of the heater's
manufacturer. 51 Such rulings obviously impose a heavy burden on plaintiffs
to act not only with due diligence but with all possible (perhaps sometimes
impossible) haste in learning the cause of their injuries and the responsible
parties. It is certainly questionable whether the plaintiff really knows of his
right to sue if he doesn't know whom to sue, or even that he has the basis
for a lawsuit against anyone; yet this is exactly what some courts have ruled.
5
1
There are, however, certain arguments that may sometimes aid a plaintiff
who is trying to establish that his ignorance delayed the running of the statute.
Sometimes there is an overlap between a lack of knowledge of injury (which,
as has been shown, will often prevent the running of the statute) and lack
of knowledge of the cause. Often, the plaintiff lacks knowledge of a pro-
duct's defect or its harmful effects because the results of using the product
are gradual. If use of the product is unaccompanied by sudden or perceptible
trauma, recognition of the causal connection between the product and the
injury is rendered nearly impossible. In such situations, the courts seem more
sympathetic to the plaintiff's ignorance of the cause of injury, despite the
plaintiff's having had some knowledge of the gradually developing injury itself.
Thus, an Illinois case ruled that only when the plaintiff had discovered that
his illness was the result of exposure to chemical compounds manufactured
by the defendant did his action accrue, even though he had known of the
illness for some time.5 4 The court analogized this situation to the medical
malpractice area, apparently finding the situation closer to those in which
an illness is brought on by improper medical treatment than to those in which
a defective product causes a sudden accident. This same attitude has been
exhibited by other courts in dealing with the gradual development of high
blood pressure, or blindness, 6 or even eventual death.5 1 In some of these
cases, the courts have emphasized that despite the fact that medical authorities
were promptly consulted, they could not for some time determine the possi-
ble causal link between the defendant's product and the plaintiff's harm. 58
52. Pratt v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 71 Ill. App. 3d 825, 390 N.E.2d 471 (1979).
53. See Howe v. Pioneer Mfg. Co., 262 Cal. App. 2d 330, 68 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1968) (in
suit by persons injured by inhaling gas escaping from defectively manufactured furnace, statute
of limitations began to run when injury was suffered, even though plaintiffs were ignorant of
cause of action or identity of wrongdoer).
54. Wigginton v. Reichold Chem., Inc., 133 Il1. App. 2d 776, 274 N.E.2d 118 (1971). Accord,
McDonald v. Reichold Chem., Inc., 133 Il. App. 2d 780, 274 N.E.2d 121 (1971).
55. Gilbert v. Jones, 523 S.W.2d 211 (Tenn. App. 1974).
56. Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 412 F. Supp. 1392 (D.N.H. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 628
(1st Cir. 1977) (applying New Hampshire law).
57. Newcomer v. G.D. Searle & Co., 378 F. Supp. 1154 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (question of fact
as to when the plaintiffs knew or should have known that defendant's drug could have been
a factor in causing decedent's death; applying Pennsylvania law).
58. Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 412 F. Supp. 1392 (D.N.H. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 628
(lst Cir. 1977); Wigginton v. Reichold Chem. Co., 133 Ill. App.2d 776, 274 N.E.2d 118 (1971).
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Other arguments can help the plaintiff who is unaware of the possible accrual
of a cause of action. The plaintiff may contend that fraud or other wrongful
conduct on the defendant's part has caused the alleged defect, its causal con-
nection with the plaintiff's illness, or the identity of the defendant to remain
concealed from the plaintiff. All courts are generally receptive to arguments
for relief against the running of the statutory period where those arguments
are based on the defendant's wrongful conduct. Thus, if the defendant has
knowingly concealed information about its product that would have led the
plaintiff to realize the possible link between that product and the plaintiff's
harm, a court may find the defendant equitably estopped from asserting the
statute of limitations.5 9 If a manufacturer has, by its representations, lulled
the plaintiff into a reasonable belief that the manufacturer's product is safe
and has failed to give notice of harmful effects of which the manufacturer
should reasonably have been aware, a court may simply rule that the statute
did not start to run until plaintiff was aware of the cause of his harm." Often
the court will rule the statute tolled during the time of the fraudulent conceal-
ment. In a California case, the statute tolled where it was shown that defend-
ant manufacturer of an airplane had known of defects in the plane's fuel
system but had specifically represented to the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion that the fuel system was safe and had concealed the correct information
about its condition.
61
Sometimes there will be disputed issues of fact as to the existence of the
fraud or concealment necessary to prevent running of the statute. Defendant's
motions for dismissal will then be denied until these issues can be resolved
by the trier of fact. 62 Thus, one early case involving a plaintiff who alleged
he had contracted cancer as a result of smoking the defendant's tobacco pro-
ducts found disputed questions of fact regarding the defendant's failure to
warn and its allegedly misleading advertisements. 6 It should be noted that
an occasional court will strictly apply the rule that the statutory period runs
from the moment of injury and will largely ignore contentions of fraud or
concealment."'
59. See Perry v. A.H. Robins Co., 560 F. Supp. 834 (N.D.N.Y. 1983). See generally Annot.,
24 A.L.R.2d 1413 (1952); Annot., 3 L.Ed. 2d 1886 (1959). See also Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 760 (1972).
60. See Warrington v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 564, 80 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1969)
(plaintiff and her physician relied on pharmaceutical company's express representation as to safety
of its drug when company knew or should have known drug was unsafe and that its use by
pregnant women involved serious risk). See generally Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 429 (1972).
61. Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 39 Cal. App. 3d 315, 114 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1974).
62. Hoeflich v. William S. Merrell Co., 288 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (dispute over
whether drug company had concealed information on possible side-effects; applying Pennsylvania
law).
63. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1963) (applying Louisiana
law).
64. See Walker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 320 So. 2d 418 (Fla. App. 1975), cert. dismissed,
338 So. 2d 843 (1976), holding that plaintiff widow's lack of knowledge of the possible defective
design of plane which crashed, killing her husband, did not affect running of statute of limita.
tions on her action against airplane manufacturer).
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Most courts are willing to modify the usual rules in situations of gradually
developing disease or injury, or in situations of fraudulent conduct or inten-
tional concealment on the part of defendants. Otherwise, however, the plain-
tiff is likely to face the often harsh rule that the statute runs from date of
injury or reasonable time for discovery of injury, not from the date when
the plaintiff learns of the cause of the harm. Even where the court is willing
to bend the rule a bit and hold that the statute does not run until the plaintiff
could reasonably have learned the cause of his injury and the person respon-
sible, the court is almost certain to put the burden on the plaintiff of
establishing this excuse for delay.65 Plaintiffs may also have to contend with
the often inflexible judicial posture of very strict construction of survival and
wrongful death statutes. 66 Finally, a few courts may hold a plaintiff to an
even stricter standard than the usual one of having to file within the pre-
scribed time from date of injury. They may rule that the cause of action ac-
crued earlier if the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged defect
at a prior date.61 Unpredictability of result in this area is also increased by
the nonexistence in some jurisdictions of any statute clearly applicable to pro-
ducts liability actions. Courts may thus end up applying a catch-all provision
covering "civil actions not otherwise mentioned," or similar language.
6
1
Statute of Limitations in Warranty
The general rule of limitations as to products cases brought under a strict
tort theory, or a negligence theory, is clear: The relevant tort statute applies,
and it ordinarily starts to run at the date of injury. Those jurisdictions that
once held to the contrary and applied the contract statute, running from the
date of sale,'69 have overruled that authority and adopted the majority view.
70
But the plaintiff has an additional option on which to base a product liability
claim: breach of warranty, express or implied. If he uses this theory, what
statute of limitations will apply?
The Uniform Commercial Code, in effect in all states but Louisiana, pro-
vides that an action must be brought within four years from the time of
65. See McDaniel v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 542 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. I11. 1982) (asbestos-
related diseases allegedly caused by occupational exposure to asbestos products supplied by defen-
dant; applying Illinois law).
66. See McDaniel v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
("discovery" rule inapplicable to survival act claims under Illinois law). But see Eisenmann v.
Cantor Bros., Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1347 (N.D. Ill. 1983), reaching a contrary result under Illinois law.
67. See Maly v. Magnavox Co., 460 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (strict liability and negligence
claims against manufacturer of television set that caught fire and damaged plaintiff's house accrued
when fire occurred, unless it was shown that buyer knew or should have known of alleged defect
earlier; applying Mississippi law).
68. Romano v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 114 R.I. 451, 336 A.2d 555 (1975) (civil actions
not "otherwise specifically provided" for).
69. Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 253 N.E.2d
207 (1969); Jackson v. General Motors Corp., 223 Tenn. 12, 441 S.W.2d 482 (1969).
70. Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 335 N.E.2d
275 (1975); McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487 (Tenn. 1975).
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accrual, 7' and that accrual takes place when the breach occurs. 72 Some jurisdic-
tions in enacting the Code have provided a different period of limitation,
such as five or six years rather than four; 7 and many states have other statutes
on breach-of-contract actions that arguably could apply to products cases;
however, the date of accrual remains the same. The date of breach, and thus
of accrual, has been held to mean the date when the defective product was
delivered. 7 This rule has been applied despite the fact that it creates a dif-
ferent time of accrual from that applicable to a tort claim, although the tort
claim may be asserted in the same action based upon the same occurrence."
The "date of delivery" has in turn been interpreted as meaning the date of
sale to the owner-the person in ownership, possession, or control at the time
the product causes harm. 76 Thus, it is usually said that "date of sale," not
"date of injury," governs.
77
However, both the Code and pertinent case law have recognized certain
qualifications to this general rule. The Code provides that if a warranty
expressly extends to the future performance of a product, a cause of action
does not accrue until a breach of warranty is or should reasonably have been
discovered.78 For example, in a case involving a burial vault, 79 the defendant
manufacturer stated that the vault would "give satisfactory service at all
times." Because the warranty extended to future performance, the court held
that when plaintiff exhumed the body of her husband for transfer to another
cemetery and found that a leak in the casket had caused damage to the casket
and the body, the cause of action accrued at the time she discovered the defect.
Distinguishing warranties of future performance from other warranties can
be very difficult. One court found a warranty of future performance in a
seller's statement that a heating system would work well in subzero
temperatures, since discovery of any breach could not occur until the arrival
71. U.C.C. § 2-725(l) (1978).
72. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1978). Section 2-725 has been held to supersede the general statute
of limitations on contract actions when a sale of goods is involved. Sesow v. Swearingin, 552
P.2d 705, 706-07 (Okla. 1976). See Cochran v. Buddy Spencer Mobile Homes, Inc., 618 P.2d
947, 950 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980).
73. For example, Oklahoma allows five years. 12A OKaA. STAT. § 2-725(1) (1981). See generally
Annot., 91 A.L.R.3d 455, 465 (1979).
74. See Johnson v. Hockessin Tractor, Inc., 420 A.2d 154 (Del. 1980).
75. See Amermac, Inc. v. Gordon, 182 Ind. App. 116, 394 N.E.2d 946 (1979); Lewis v.
John Royle & Sons, 70 Misc. 2d 304, 357 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. 1974), aff'd, 46 A.D.2d 304,
362 N.Y.S.2d 262 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (lower court refers to "strict tort liability" as accruing
from time of sale and "strict products liability," founded on a tortious wrong, as accruing at
time of injury; but such terminology is generally rejected in favor of contrasting "breach of
warranty" with "strict tort liability").
76. See McKee v. Johns-Manville Corp., 94 Misc. 2d 327, 404 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. 1978)
(when defendants last sold product).
77. Nelson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1120 (D.N.H. 1970) (applying
New Hampshire law).
78. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1978).
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of cold weather."0 Another case, however, held that a statement that a welder
could perform a specified number of welds per minute was only a warranty
of present, not future, performance, despite the inability to discover the un-
truth of the assertion until the welder was used.81 Similarly, establishing that
the manufacturer had a continuing duty to warn can delay the accrual of
the cause of action. It has been held that the statute of limitations does not
then run so long as the duty exists."2
With these possible qualifications, the "date of delivery" rule has been
applied even where the suit is against a remote defendant, i.e., where the
ultimate purchaser or someone injured during his ownership sues the manufac-
turer. Nonetheless, the date of delivery to the purchaser controls, not the date
when the product left the hands of the manufacturer.8 3 Furthermore, the Code
statute of limitations has often been applied even though the harm suffered
involved personal injury or other traditionally "tort" type damage, such as
that suffered due to escape of gas from a conduit.8 4 In such situations, the
plaintiff may waive the tort and sue instead on the breach of warranty. 5 But,
of course, plaintiff may actually assert both theories. Even if the statute is
found to have run on the tort count, he may still prevail on the warranty
claim. 6
Warranty liability obviously involves obligations different from negligence
liability. While warranty liability is based on express or implied assertions
of the suitability of the goods for certain purposes, negligence liability is pre-
mised on the duty of individuals to use due care.8 7 This "warranty option,"
then, would possibly allow the plaintiff to take advantage of a longer statute,
since the Code period is always at least four years. But the plaintiff must
keep in mind that the Code statute runs from time of delivery, except for
the above mentioned qualifications. 8 Neither injury nor discovery of injury
is necessary to start the statute running." A little authority to the contrary
exists. In a case involving alleged breach of warranty for transfusion of in-
80. Perry v. Augustine, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 416 (1965).
81. Binkley Co. v. Teledyne Mid-Am. Corp., 460 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1972) (applying Missouri
law). See the discussion of these same "future performance" cases in D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS,
PRODUCTS LIABILrrY IN A NUTSHELL 135 (2d ed. 1981).
82. See Boains v. Lasar Mfg. Co., 330 F. Supp. 1134 (D. Conn. 1971).
83. See Wilson v. White Motor Corp., 118 Il. App. 2d 436, 254 N.E.2d 277 (1969); Bates
v. Shapard, 224 Tenn. 672, 461 S.W.2d 946 (1970).
84. As in Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964).
85. Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (1933). See generally Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d
703 (1954).
86. See Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co., 166 Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94 (1936). Of course, in these
early cases the Uniform Commercial Code did not exist, and the courts applied the relevant
contract statute.
87. Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953), rejecting
Buyers v. Buffalo Paint & Spec., 199 Misc. 764, 99 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Schlick v.
New York Dugan Bros., Inc., 175 Misc. 182, 22 N.Y.S.2d 238 (N.Y. City Ct. 1940).
88. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
89. See Simmons v. Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d 509 (Ala. 1979).
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fected blood, the court held that the statute did not run until the breach (i.e.,
the defect) was or should reasonably have been discovered. 9"
Giving the plaintiff the option of using the Code statute, even where plain-
tiff's injuries are "tortious" in nature, has been controversial because the
applicable statute depends on which theory of recovery is used; thus, actions
involving exactly the same injury are often treated quite differently. Some
courts have come increasingly to the view that the type of harm suffered should
control the applicable statute of limitations, not whether the caption on the
complaint reads "breach of warranty" or "strict tort." Contrary to the above-
cited cases,9 ' some authority now holds that, at least where recovery is sought
for personal injuries, the tort statute should govern, even if the action is stated
as involving a breach of warranty. 92 These cases have emphasized the basical-
ly tortious nature of the claim."1 Under this reasoning, use of the warranty
statute can be denied even where plaintiff was in privity of contract with
defendant, thus arguably bringing the Code fully into operation.94
All the cases denying application of the Code or the contract statute of
limitations have one common theme: The form of pleading used is immaterial
and the alleged injury should be determinative of the applicable statute. Thus,
a federal case from California in which the plaintiff had become ill after
discovering a dead mouse in a bottle of the defendant's beer held that the
statute of limitations for injuries caused by a negligent or wrongful act applied,
despite the plaintiff's attempt to base her action on breach of an implied war-
ranty of fitness." The court reasoned that the contract merely gave rise to
the duty allegedly breached by the defendant, while the gravamen of the com-
90. Lewis v. Associated Med. Inst., Inc., 345 So. 2d 852 (Fla. App. 1977), cert. denied,
353 So. 2d 676. Cf. Reiterman v. Westinghouse, Inc., 106 Mich. App. 698, 308 N.W.2d 612
(1981) (breach of warranty action against manufacturer of electric clothes dryer accrued when
dryer caused fatal electric shock as this indicated product may have been defective).
91. See supra notes 74-77, 83-87 & 89 and accompanying text.
92. See Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 703 (1954).
93. See Wetzel v. Commercial Chain Co., 18 Ariz. App. 54, 500 P.2d 314 (1972); Citizens
Cas. Co. v. Aeroquip Corp., 10 Mich. App. 244, 159 N.W.2d 223 (1968). Cf. Morris v. Wise,
293 P.2d 547 (Okla. 1955) (action growing out of automobile accident must be brought within
two years of accident; denial by each of two occupants of car that he was driving is insufficient
to keep statute from running); Waugh v. Guthrie Gas, Light, Fuel & Improvement Co., 37 Okla.
239, 131 P. 174 (1913) (mere failure to disclose that cause of action exists does not prevent
running of statute). But cf. Hepp Bros. Inc. v. Evans, 420 P.2d 477 (Okla. 1966) (breach of
warranty action did not accrue until discovery of defect).
94. See Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973) (truck driver who had
purchased defective tire could not use Code statute of limitations in action for personal injuries
against either retailer or manufacturer; Code applies only to nonpersonal injury claims).
95. Zellmer v. Acme Brewing Co., 184 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1950). See Rubino v. Utah Can-
ning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (1954) (action for harm suffered from eating unfit
peas canned by defendant had to be brought within period for personal injury actions, not within
period for implied warranty actions). Cf. Patterson v. Vincent, 44 Del. 442, 61 A.2d 416 (Super.
Ct. 1948) (action for injurious result of use of medicine came within statute of limitations for
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plaint was the personal injuries suffered. Similarly, in an Illinois lawsuit against
a restaurant that was alleged to have served harmful food, the plaintiff claimed
that the restaurant had breached its warranty that the food was fit for human
consumption. 96 Therefore, the plaintiff contended that the statutory period
for actions based on unwritten contracts should apply, especially since he was
seeking to recover lost earnings and medical expenses. The court refused to
follow this reasoning, however, and ruled that because all the alleged damages
arose out of a personal injury, the statutory period on personal injury claims
should govern. A court applying Kentucky law has stated that whether an
action sounds in contract or in tort or grows out of violation of a statute
should be irrelevant in determining the proper statute of limitations. So long
as the harm for which recovery is sought is physical injury to a person, the
statutory period on personal injury claims should control.9
7
Many of the modern cases, in deciding whether to apply contract, rather
than tort, period of limitation, weigh the desirability of "symmetry," i.e.,
of having the same statute of limitations apply to certain types of harm
regardless of whether the action is brought under a tort or a warranty theory.
However, the recognition of the need for, or the desirability of, such sym-
metry is hardly universal. Pennsylvania is a good example of a jurisdiction
in which the court has struggled with this question. Pre-Code Pennsylvania
cases exhibited a tendency to look to the nature of the injury alleged in deter-
mining the relevant statutory period and to deny application of the contract
statute when personal injury was the basis of the claim." This approach was
altered in a 1962 case brought by a plaintiff allegedly injured by a defect
in his washing machine. Because the claim was asserted under the Uniform
Commercial Code, a Pennsylvania court held that the period specified in sec-
tion 2-725 of the Code applied." Several years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reached the same result in a case in which the plaintiffs alleged a breach
of warranty by a gas company resulting in personal injury.' 0 The court here
relied on the section of the Code that states that all legislation inconsistent
with the Code was repealed by adoption of that law and found that this had
repealed the tort statute of limitations insofar as it applied to actions covered
by the Code."' But recently, in an action involving an employee who claimed
to have been injured by a defective boiler purchased by his employer, the
96. Seymour v. Union News Co., 349 I11. App. 197, 110 N.E.2d 475 (1953).
97. Finck v. Albers Super Mkts., Inc., 136 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943) (applying Kentucky law).
98. See Jones v. Boggs & Buhl, Inc., 355 Pa. 242, 49 A.2d 379 (1946); Bradley v. Laubach,
23 Pa. D. 151 (1914). But see McGrath v. Helena Rubinstein, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y.
1939), applying Pennsylvania law and finding an action for breach of warranty not within that
state's statute of limitations on actions for personal injuries.
99. Engleman v. Eastern Light Co., 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 38 (1962).
100. Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964). See Natale v.
Upjohn Co., 356 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1966); Patterson v. Her Majesty Indus., Inc., 450 F. Supp.
425 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Hoffman v. A.B. Chance Co., 339 F. Supp. 1385 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Hoeflich
v. William S. Merrell Co., 288 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
101. U.C.C. § 10-103 (1962).
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Pennsylvania court shifted gears. The court reenlisted the assistance of the
symmetry principle and ruled that the tort statute of limitations should apply
even though the suit alleged a breach of warranty.'02
Note, however, that this reaffirmation of symmetry was in a case in which
no privity existed between the plaintiff and the defendant since the plaintiff
had not purchased the product. In another recent case, a Pennsylvania court
upheld application of the Code period of limitation where the plaintiff was
suing his immediate seller. 0 3 On review of that case, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court appeared to do a complete reversal: In again upholding application
of the Code to a suit by a buyer against his immediate seller, the court stated
in dictum that even a plaintiff suing a remote defendant with whom he had
no privity could use the Code's limitation period if he based his claim on
breach of warranty.' 4
Similarly, despite indications in Kentucky that the nature of the injury, rather
than the form of the action should determine the applicable statute,'0 5 a re-
cent federal case held that a personal injury action alleging breach of warran-
ty is governed by the Code.'0 6 Texas has specifically rejected the need for
legal symmetry regarding the statute of limitations applied to defective pro-
duct claims involving personal injury.'0 7 Authorities rejecting symmetry
sometimes note that the Code's application is not limited to cases dealing
with commercial losses and that the option of using the Code and its limita-
tion period should thus be available to those incurring personal injuries.' 00
In other cases, however, the symmetry argument has prevailed. A New Jersey
opinion dealt with a suit against both the retail dealer and the manufacturer
of a truck whose defects were alleged to have caused the plaintiff's personal
injuries.' 09 Despite the plaintiffs privity with one of the parties sued, the court
refused to apply the Code's period of limitation, stating that although the
case might have arisen from the consequences of a sale, it was essentially
a personal injury action that could not be changed by the plaintiff's labeling
it "breach of contract." Few authorities have, however, yet been willing to
go that far and often the victory of symmetry is only partial. For example,
in a Rhode Island case plaintiffs sued a party with whom they lacked privity
and argued for application of the four-year Code statute. The court looked
to the gist of the complaint rather than its caption and applied the tort
102. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 256 Pa. Super. 330, 389 A.2d 1148 (1978), aff'd
per curiam, 492 Pa. 258, 424 A.2d 497 (1981). Accord, Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 625
F.2d 1095 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981).
103. Williams v. West Penn Power Co., 313 Pa. Super. 461, 460 A.2d 278 (1983).
104. Williams v. West Penn Power Co., 502 Pa. 557, 467 A.2d 811 (1983).
105. See Finck v. Albers Super Mkts., Inc., 136 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943).
106. Ted v. American Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (applying Ken-
tucky law).
107. Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980).
108. See Burch, A Practitioner's Guide to the Statute of Limitations in Products Liability
Suits, 5 BALTIMORE L. REv. 23, 27-28 (1975); Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories
and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974, 995 (1966).
109. Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973).
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statute."I° However, in a later case in which the plaintiffs sued the dealer from
whom they had bought an automobile with allegedly defective tires, and also
sued the automobile and tire manufacturers, the court found the action
governed by the tort statute as to the manufacturers, but found the Code
period of limitation applicable as to the dealer."' This may be considered
a compromise position, but it makes the applicable statute of limitations de-
pend on the theory used, not the type of harm that has occurred, and may
result in different treatment of two claims for the same kind of harm. It leaves
the plaintiff who had no contractual dealings with his defendant unable to
use the potentially longer Code statute," 2 but would allow this option to a
plaintiff who can show privity with the defendant.
This middle position-neither totally rejecting the Code where personal in-
jury is involved nor allowing the Code to be used in all cases of allegedly
defective products-has been adopted by Oklahoma. In the 1974 case of Moss
v. Polyco, Inc.' ' 3 the court dealt with a case in which plaintiff was injured
in a restaurant when a can of drain cleaner fell from a shelf in the restaurant's
restroom and its contents spilled on her. Plaintiff sued the manufacturers and
suppliers of the cleaner twenty-eight months after the injury occurred. Thus,
the action was not brought within the two-year statutory period for tort claims.
Clearly, no privity existed between the plaintiff and the defendants. Noting
that the Code "has to do with commercial transactions,"' 'I and applies where
the buyer is in privity with a seller, the court ruled that the two-year tort
statute applied, rather than the five-year period provided by Oklahoma's ver-
sion of the Code. The court pointed out that section 2-318 of the Code
specifically extends warranty protection to designated third-party
beneficiaries-any natural person in the family or household of the buyer
and any guest in his home. The plaintiff, however, did not come within this
coverage.'" The court observed that while the Code "parallels the doctrine
of strict liability in tort," '"16 the tw6 theories are separate and should not be
confused. Also rejected was the contention that the statutory period for con-
tracts not in writing should be applied. The court simply noted that the action
did not arise upon contract but was based on an alleged tort.
The Moss holding was reiterated by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in another
case decided the same day in which plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a pro-
110. Kelly v. Ford Motor Co., 110 R.I. 83, 290 A.2d 607 (1972).
111. Plouffe v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 118 R.I. 288, 373 A.2d 492 (1977) (but no
breach of warranty found, since proof was lacking that defect existed in tires at time of delivery).
112. See Citizens Cas. Co. v. Aeroquip. Corp., 10 Mich. App. 244, 159 N.W.2d 223 (1968).
113. 522 P.2d 622 (Okla. 1974).
114. Id. at 625.
115. Id., citing in support Klimas v. International Tel. &Tel. Corp., 297 F. Supp. 937 (D.R.I.
1969).
116. Moss v. Polyco, Inc., 522 P2d 622, 626 (Okla. 1974). In support of its statement that
the Uniform Commercial Code and the doctrine of strict liability in tort are parallel but should
not be confused with one another, the court cited Beauchamp v. Wilson, 21 Ariz. App. 14,
515 P.2d 41 (1973); Caruth v. Mariani, 11 Ariz. App. 188, 463 P.2d 83 (1970).
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duct." 7 The court stated that because Oklahoma had adopted strict tort liability
for defective products," 8 the only possible implied warranty recovery would
be under the Code. Since the plaintiff had not alleged facts that would bring
the Code into operation,' ' 9 the tort statute of limitations would necessarily
apply. A federal case applying Oklahoma law subsequently applied the same
rule, concluding that under Oklahoma law even a plaintiff who comes within
Code section 2-318 cannot use the Code and its statute of limitations against
a party such as a manufacturer with whom plaintiff had no privity. 12
A later Oklahoma case specifically denied the use of the Code and its statute
of limitations to an employee of the purchaser, since employees are not among
the listed prospective plaintiffs in section 2-318."' The court clearly stated
that both negligence and strict tort actions for defective products are governed
by the two-year tort period. But what if plaintiff is within section 2-318 and
does have privity with defendant? In accord with the dicta in the above-cited
cases, in 1980 the court of appeals held that such a plaintiff has the alter-
native of using the warranty theory and can then take advantage of the Code
statute of limitations.' 22 The plaintiff must simply plead facts that bring arti-
cle 2 of the Code into operation. Such pleading must, of course, establish
a "sale" from defendant to plaintiff, 23 and the Code has thus been held in-
117. O'Neal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 523 P.2d 614 (Okla. 1974). Cf. Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 742 n.3 (1980), saying that under Oklahoma law, a products liability
suit is governed by the two-year tort statute whether brought on a negligence or a warranty
basis. This case involved a plaintiff (a worker injured by an allegedly defective nail) not in privity
with defendant (manufacturer of the nail). Therefore, the Uniform Commercial Code did not apply.
118. Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974), decided the same day
as Moss and O'Neal. See McNichols, supra note 2. The Kirkland case and other early Oklahoma
authority applying strict tort liability referred to the doctrine as "manufacturers' products liability,"
but this was clearly the same as what is usually designated "strict liability in tort."
119. O'Neal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 523 P.2d 614, 615 (Okla. 1974). Section 2-725 of
the Code was said to have "Code application only." Id. at 616. The court never specifically
states why the Code could not come into operation in this case, but it seems clearly due to
the lack of privity, i.e., defendant was the manufacturer rather than a party with whom the
plaintiff had dealt. The court also rejected application of the Oklahoma statute on contract claims,
12 OKLA. STAT. § 95(2) (1981), since the only possible bases of recovery other than the Code
were negligence and strict tort liability, both of which come within the tort statute of limitations,
12 OKLA. STAT. § 95(3) (1981). Id. at 615.
120. Nichols v. Eli Lilly & Co., 501 F.2d 392 (10th Cir. 1974) (buyer injured by using allegedly
defective birth control pills barred by the two-year tort statute of limitations in action against
the manufacturer).
121. Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306 (Okla. 1975) (allegedly defective cleaning product
manufactured by defendant and sold to plaintiff's employer).
122. Cochran v. Buddy Spencer Mobile Homes, Inc., 618 P.2d 947 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980)
(action by mobile home buyer against retail seller, alleging breach of implied warranty arising
from contract for sale of home). The court held that the Uniform Commercial Code statute
of limitations, providing a period of five years from the time of sale, superseded the general
Oklahoma statute of limitations on contracts-in this case, the three-year period for an implied
contract not in writing. Id. at 950. Thus, Oklahoma will allow use of the Code statute of limita-
tions if. (1) plaintiff is a buyer or a party otherwise coming within section 2-318 of the Code,
and (2) plaintiff or his buyer is in privity with defendant.
123. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1977) (express warranty); U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977) (implied warranty of
fitness for particular purpose); U.C.C. § 2-315 (1977) (implied warranty of merchantability).
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applicable in a patient's suit against a hospital because this is interpreted as
a "service" transaction.' 24
Expansion and Contraction of the Warranty Remedy
The restriction on the use of warranty theory to those who are in privity
with their defendant is a relatively recent development and runs counter to
earlier Oklahoma cases decided prior to the adoption of strict tort liability.'2
In 1945, Oklahoma held that manufacturers who prepare food or beverage
and place it in sealed containers with the intention that the container not be
opened until the time of consumption impliedly warrant the fitness of the
contents and can be sued for breach of such warranty by a consumer who
is not in privity.' 2' In 1964 the Oklahoma court applied this same extension
of warranty liability to products manufactured for use on the human body.' 7
And in 1967, the court largely abrogated the privity requirement when it
allowed an implied warranty action against a manufacturer by a retail pur-
chaser of a battery, despite the plaintiff's lack of direct contractual dealing
with the manufacturer.'28 The court recognized public policy as requiring
recognition of implied warranties extending to the ultimate consumer, and
the court's reasoning edged close to adoption of strict liability in tort.'
29
In 1967 a federal case applied the implied warranty sections of the Code
in favor of a plaintiff who was an employee of the purchaser, injured when
124. Redwine v. Baptist Gen'l Convention, 681 P.2d 1121 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982) (hospital's
charging patient for use of medical equipment not a "sale" within Code sections on implied
warranties of fitness and merchantability; thus five-year Code statute of limitations did not apply).
125. See Note, Torts: A Primer on Strict Liability in Tort in Oklahoma, 23 OKLA. L. REV.
304 (1970). See generally Note, Torts- Products Liability-Oklahoma's Emergence from Anti-
quity, Acceptance of the Doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort, 6 TULSA L.J. 61 (1969).
126. See Griffin v. Asbury, 196 Okla. 484, 165 P.2d 822 (1945). See also Jackson v. Cushing
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 445 P.2d 797 (Okla. 1968); Sneed v. Beaverson, 395 P.2d 414 (Okla.
1964); Cook v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 330 P.2d 375 (Okla. 1958), all also allowing recovery for
breach of implied warranty, in food-and-drink situations, against a defendant with whom there
was no privity. Cf. Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Newton, 205 Okla. 360, 237 P.2d
627 (1951); Southwest Ice & Dairy Prod. Co. v. Faulkenberry, 203 Okla. 279, 220 P.2d 257
(1950), both having language indicating that implied warranty liability could exist for defective
food or drink regardless of privity; however, both used negligence terminology. Oklahoma, like
most states, long ago abandoned any requirement of privity in negligence cases involving injury-
causing products. See Bower v. Corbell, 408 P.2d 307 (Okla. 1965); Gosnell v. Zink, 325 P.2d
965 (Okla. 1958); Crane Co. v. Sears, 168 Okla. 603, 35 P.2d 916 (1934).
127. John A. Brown Co. v. Shelton, 391 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1964) (hair spray).
128. Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1965), noted 20 OKLA. L. REV.
326 (1967).
129. The court quoted the leading strict liability in tort case, Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962), for the propositions that (1) strict
liability should be extended to nonfood products; (2) the manufacturer should not be able to
limit the scope of liability via contract because the liability is imposed by law; (3) no privity
of contract is now required for strict liability, and other rules governing warranties do not necessarily
apply; and (4) the purpose of the strict liability is to ensure that the costs of injuries caused
by defective products are borne by those who put these products on the market. Accord, Marathon
Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900, 914-15 (Okla. 1965).
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the allegedly defective product was being used by a coworker.'3 0 The court
found privity unnecessary but also described the employee as standing in the
shoes of the employer buyer. This extension of implied warranty was specific-
ally rejected by the Oklahoma court in the Moss case, which stated that an
injured employee under such circumstances has a possible action under strict
tort liability but not under the Code.' 3' The court has subsequently specifical-
ly held that the implied warranty provisions of the Code do not extend to
employees of the purchaser.'32 Of course, between the time of the 1967 federal
case and the decision in Moss, Oklahoma adopted the theory of strict tort
liability for defective products. The court now seems to say to plaintiffs,
"We've given you this great new remedy of strict tort liability; you'll have
to use that now and forget about implied warranty unless you have privity
with your defendant and come strictly within the terms of the Code." This
is quite an about-face from the attitude in the late sixties of extending warranty
recovery to all foreseeable plaintiffs.
In the 1960s, the same expansion of warranty was occurring in many jurisdic-
tions. The privity requirement was first abolished as to food products,'33 and
by the late sixties had been abolished as to all products in practically every
jurisdiction."' During those same years, all jurisdictions except Louisiana
adopted the Uniform Commercial Code. ' 3- The Code abolishes the need for
privity as to certain potential users of a product (what is sometimes termed
"horizontal privity") under Alternative A, the most commonly adopted ver-
sion, of section 2-318.36 There are two alternative versions of section 2-318,
130. Speed Fastners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967).
131. Moss v. Polyco, Inc., 522 P.2d 622, 627 (Okla. 1974).
132. Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306 (Okla. 1975). Cf. Hardesty v. Andro Corp.,-Webster
Div., 555 P.2d 1030 (Okla. 1976) (manufacturer sold air-conditioner chiller unit to subcontractor,
to be used in fulfilling contract with apartment owner; warranty held not to extend to owner
as warranties do not extend to those without privity except as statutorily provided).
133. See, e.g., Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E.105 (1931);
Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 78 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913). See generally Prosser, The Assault
Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1104-14 (1960), stating
that by that time, twenty-two states had definitely abandoned the requirement of privity in food
cases.
134. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REv. 791 (1966), concluding that privity was dead. By this time, Prosser found that twenty-four
jurisdictions clearly did not require privity as to manufacturers of all types of products, six more
probably did not, eight did not as to certain types of products, and one did not where certain
types of plaintiffs were involved. Id. at 794-99.
135. See Miller, The Crossroads: The Case for the Code in Products Liability, 21 OKLA. L.
REv. 411, 413 (1968).
136. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1977). Alternative A of § 2-318 provides,
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who
is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude
or limit the operation of this section.
See Old Albany Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1979), holding
that section 2-318 comes into play only after a final sale is made and then limits application
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both of which extend the group of potential plaintiffs still farther.'37 The Code
is silent as to so-called "vertical privity": the requirement of privity to defend-
ants on up the line, such as manufacturers. However, vertical privity was also
being eliminated by judicial action during this period. For example, in 1959
a Pennsylvania court allowed an injured customer to sue the manufacturer
on implied warranty despite the lack of direct contractual relationship.'30 If
there was a problem with privity during these years, it was due to the reluc-
tance of some courts to extend "horizontal privity"-the users and affected
persons who could sue-beyond those specified in section 2-318 of the Code.
Thus, Pennsylvania in 1963 refused to extend warranty recovery in this direc-
tion and denied an action to an employee of a purchasing organization.' 39
But this result was persuasively criticized,' 0 and eventually the Pennsylvania
court made it clear that all privity requirements in warranty were abolished.' 4'
As in Oklahoma, the privity requirement has had renewed life in warranty
cases of recent years in other states, following adoption of strict tort recovery.
Thus, in 1980 an Indiana court declared that while privity had been eliminated
in tort law, it remains an element of breach of warranty actions.'42 Idaho
and Wisconsin have adopted strict tort liability,' 3 but have required privity
of warranties as to nonpurchasers; it has no application to a purchaser in the vertical chain
of distribution.
137. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1977). Alternative B states: "A seller's warranty whether express or im-
plied extends to any natural person who may be reasonably expected to use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may
not exclude or limit the operation of this section." Kansas has adopted this version. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 84-2-318 (1983).
Alternative C states:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may
be reasonably expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation
of this section with respect to injury to the person of the individual to whom the
warranty extends.
Hawaii has adopted this version. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 490:2-318 (1976).
Comment 3 to section 2-318 notes that beyond the extent that the need for privity (so-called
"horizontal privity") is abolished by this section, "the section is neutral and is not intended
to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties . . . extend to
others in the distributive chain."
138. Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959). See Duckworth
v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (privity of contract not required in Penn-
sylvania, at least in suits by purchasers of new automobiles against manufacturers). See generally
Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, I DUQ. L. REv. 1 (1963).
139. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
140. See Murray, Products Liability-Another Word, 35 U. PiTT. L. REv. 255, 257-62 (1973);
Murray, Pennsylvania Products Liability: A Clarification of the Search for a Clear and Under-
standable Rule, 33 U. PiTT. L. REv. 391 (1972).
141. Salvador v. Atlantic Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974). Pennsylvania did not,
however, adopt this position until strict tort liability had been developed as an additional theory
of recovery.
142. Lane v. Barringer, 407 N.E.2d 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
143. See Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974); Dippel v. Sciano,
37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
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in warranty actions. 4 Nevada also seems to take this position, at least as
to horizontal privity.'" These decisions again mean that the applicable law-
whether or not privity is required, and thus also often whether a particular
prospective plaintiff can use the Code's statute of limitations-depends on
the theory used in the action. But again, as to the need for privity as well
as the choice of statute of limitations, some authorities have found symmetry
desirable: similarity of applicable law and of result regardless of the legal
theory used. For example, Ohio put an end to the need for privity in warranty
actions in 1966t46 and has stayed with that conclusion.' 7 Lower-court authority
indicates the same'is true in New York 48 and New Jersey,' 49 and this result
has been adopted by statute in Tennessee.'
One might expect that those jurisdictions not requiring privity for the breach
of warranty action would always apply the tort statute of limitations; however,
such consistency is not readily apparent. Despite Kentucky's abrogation of
privity, " ' a federal court has held that under Kentucky law an action for
personal injuries brought under warranty is governed by the Code statute of
limitations.'5 2 Texas courts have specifically held that while privity is not re-
quired in warranty actions, the statute of limitations found in section 2-725
applies to all breach of warranty actions.'" Oklahoma decisions exhibit no
144. Robinson v. Williamson Idaho Equip. Co., 94 Idaho 819, 498 P.2d 1292 (1972); Austin
v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis. 2d 628, 273 N.W.2d 233 (1979). See Drake v. Wham-O Mfg. Co.,
373 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
145. See Amundsen v. Ohio Brass Co., 89 Nev. 378, 513 P.2d 1234 (1973) (requiring horizon-
tal privity in a warranty case; subsequently, the Nevada court did abolish vertical privity); Hiles
Co. v. Johnston Pump Co., 93 Nev. 73, 560 P.2d 154 (1977) (distinguishing but not overruling
the Amundsen case, supra, and thus leaving the horizontal privity requirement intact). See Zaika
v. Del E. Webb Corp., 508 F. Supp. 1005 (D. Nev. 1981) (applying Nevada law). Nevada had
adopted strict tort liability in Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d 135 (1970).
146. Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966) (implied
warranty). The privity requirement as to express warranty had been abolished even earlier; Rogers
v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
147. See Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975).
148. See Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 992, 354 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1974),
rev'd, 30 A.D.2d 866, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1975); Ciampichini v. Ring Bros., Inc., 40 A.D.2d
289, 339 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1973).
149. See Lamendola v. Mizell, 115 N.J. Super. 514, 280 A.2d 241 (1971).
150. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-34-104 (1980), providing that privity is not a requirement in any
negligence, strict liability, or breach of warranty actions for personal injury or property damage.
This legislatively overturned the decision in Hargrove v. Newsome, 225 Tenn. 462, 470 S.W.2d
348 (1971). The Tennessee statute was adopted after that decision. 1972 Tenn. Pub, Acts, ch.
670, § 1. Maine now has a similar statute, achieved through amendment of U.C.C. § 2-318
(1977). ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-318 (Supp. 1984). And Maine has also codified the
doctrine of strict tort liability as set forth in RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 221 (1980).
151. Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965).
152. Teel v. American Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (applying Kentucky
statute of limitations; finding substantial doubt as to which statute of limitations Kentucky would
apply and therefore applying the longer period).
153. Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980). Among cases in other
jurisdictions applying the Code statute of limitations to warranty actions, though not requiring
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such inconsistency: While Oklahoma courts do not require privity of contract
and do apply the tort statute of limitations in strict tort actions, they also
require privity and apply the Code period of limitation in warranty actions.'""
The only question is whether this is the better approach, as opposed to
that taken by other jurisdictions. For instance, a New Jersey court abolished
the need for privity in both strict tort and warranty actions and also applied
the tort statute of limitations to personal injury claims brought under either
theory.I' This approach has the advantage of simplicity and of treating alike
all actions for the same kinds of injury regardless of the caption and theory
of the complaint. In effect, it merges the tort and warranty theories in per-
sonal injury suits. However, this arguably ignores the continued existence of
the Code as a viable statute. The Oklahoma approach, on the other hand,
recognizes that there is no one theory of products liability; rather there are
several theories that are not necessarily mutually exclusive." 6 The Oklahoma
view also applies the long-recognized policy of allowing plaintiffs to use
whatever statute of limitations is most favorable to the maintenance of a cause
of action.'15
The view that favors applying the tort statute of limitations to all products
litigation is based partly on the idea that the Code was not intended to cover
"tort" damages, i.e., those awarded for personal injury or property damage.
Rather, the Code was intended to apply to loss of profits or other expecta-
tions between parties in a commercial setting.' 3 It has, however, been well
observed by a leading commentator that the Code, though focusing on deals
between business persons, also devotes specific attention to sales to ultimate
consumers,'" 9 and that the Code is particularly concerned with personal in-
privity in such matters, are Maly v. Magnavox Co., 460 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (Mississippi
law); Johnson v. Hockessin Tractor, Inc., 420 A.2d 154 (Del. 1980). Such holdings are criticized
in Wade, Tort Liability for Products Causing Physical Injury and Article 2 of the U.C.C., 48
Mo. L. REV. 1 (1983). The author states that section 2-725 of the Code "is quite appropriate
for a contract action but utterly unsuitable for a personal injury action." Id. at 11 n.49. See
Murray, Products Liability v. Warranty Claims: Untangling the Web, 3 J.L. & CoM. 269 (1983).
154. See Hester v. Purex Corp., 534 P.2d 1306 (Okla. 1975); Moss v. Polyco, Inc., 522 P.2d
622 (Okla. 1974). Rhode Island has adopted the same view: It has applied the tort statute to
cases involving parties not in privity. Kelly v. Ford Motor Co., 110 R.I. 83, 290 A.2d 607 (1972).
It has allowed use of the Code statute of limitations where the parties are in privity. Plouffe
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 118 R.I. 288, 373 A.2d 492 (1977) (warranty statute could
be used as to retail dealer).
155. Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 118 N.J. Super. 116, 286 A.2d 718 (1972). See Victorson
v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 335 N.E.2d 275 (1975) (statute
on personal injuries applies to claims by remote users-i.e., those not in privity with defendant).
156. See Rivera v. Berkeley Super Wash, Inc., 44 A.D.2d 316, 354 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1974), aff'd,
37 N.Y.2d 395, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 335 N.E.2d 275 (1975). See generally Comment, supra note 3.
157. See Note, Products Liability, supra note 3.
158. See Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968). See generally
McNichols, supra note 2, at 371, observing that the notion that the Code has to do primarily
with commercial transactions involving a buyer and seller in privity of contract is the basis for
the Oklahoma court's decisions in the statute of limitations cases.
159. Franklin, supra note 108, at 995.
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jury problems. '6 0 The Code provides warranty liability, regardless of the type
of harm that has occurred, in situations of privity and in those nonprivity
situations specified in section 2-318, leaving the states free to allow or disallow
other nonprivity liability for various types of harm.' 6' Many states, including
Oklahoma, have now chosen to develop no nonprivity liability in warranty,
but still recognize the warranty action where there is privity. When the war-
ranty recovery is then allowed, it is being allowed under the Code and thus
it makes sense to apply the Code statute of limitations. Despite the presence
of privity, and thus the possible use of the Code, the plaintiff also has the
option of using the tort theory and its statutory period. 16"
Statutes of Repose
Although the breach of warranty action and its statute of limitations remain
available to the plaintiff in some jurisdictions, most defective product cases
are governed by the tort statute of limitations that ordinarily runs from the
date of injury, and sometimes from a later date when the injury was discovered.
This means that a cause of action may arise against a manufacturer or seller
many years after that party has surrendered control of the product. Potential
defendants believe this situation is unfair. Theoretically, even under strict lia-
bility in tort, there is a substantial burden on plaintiff: the burden of showing
the product was defective when it left the defendant's hands. But in practice,
if the product appears to have been defective when it injured the plaintiff,
the defendant may find himself held liable unless he can establish that the
defect was caused by some act that intervened between his control and the
time of the accident. Therefore, defendants have lobbied for "statutes of
repose" (or "statutes of ultimate repose") that set an outer limit on the period
following a seller's surrender of control within which the sellers and manufac-
turers can be held liable. Some of these statutes were passed even before strict
tort liability was adopted in a particular jurisdiction, but the legislation may
nonetheless be broad enough to cover strict tort claims." 3 The statutes often
set the outer limit in terms of a certain number of years from the first sale,"64
160. Id., citing U.C.C. §§ 2-318 & 2-719 (1977).
161. See id. at 999-1003.
162. See Layman v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 224 Tenn. 396, 455 S.W.2d 594 (1970).
163. See Cavan v. General Motors Corp., 280 Or. 455, 571 P.2d 1249 (1977); Johnson v.
Star Mach. Co., 270 Or. 694, 530 P.2d 53 (1974), both applying to strict tort liability claims
the Oregon statute, which provides that no action for negligent injury to persons or property
shall be commenced more than ten years from the occurrence of the alleged act. See generally
Note, Statutes of Repose in Products Liability: The Assault upon the Citadel of Strict Liability,
23 S.D.L. REV. 149 (1978).
164. See Ruiz v. Harris Corp., 532 F. Supp. 139, 141 (N.D. 111. 1980), applying an Illinois
law stating that no action could be brought more than "12 years from date of first sale, lease,
or delivery of possession." See generally Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation-A New
Immunity for Product Suppliers, 1977 INs. L.J. 535; Note, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation:
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or the original purchase, 1s of the product. These statutes are similar to statutes
that have also been adopted in a number of jurisdictions that set a limit on
the period of liability of those engaged in the design or construction of
buildings.' 6
Statutes of repose have been held to apply even in the face of a defendant's
ongoing duty to warn or to provide updated safety instructions or devices,'
6 7
and may not be tolled by a disability, such as plaintiff's insanity, that would
toll an ordinary statute of limitations.' 8 The repose legislation obviously in-
dicates a strong policy of putting an end at some point to possible litigation,
despite this resulting in occasional unfairness to the injured parties. Thus,
even in a jurisdiction that does not start the running of the regular statute
of limitations until the defendant has been identified as the source of harm,
a statute of repose will be held to have run from the date it specifies."69
Sometimes a court may, even without legislation, apply a presumption that
when an injury did not occur till long after sale of a product, the product
must not have been defective when sold.'
70
Statutes of repose are, naturally, under sharp attack from the plaintiffs'
bar.-Possible responses to such attacks may be amendments to the legisla-
tion, creating exceptions for certain kinds of product-related injury, such as
asbestosis, that are particularly unlikely to surface till long after sale of the
product."' But broad constitutional attacks have also been mounted against
these statutes.' 72 Most frequently, constitutional arguments are based on state
165. See Baird v. Electro Mart Factory Direct, Inc., 47 Or. App. 565, 615 P.2d 335 (1980)
(Oregon law; action must be commenced within two years of loss, which must have occurred
within eight years of original purchase).
166. See, interpreting these statutes, Calendonia Community Hosp. v. Liebenberg Smiley Glotter
& Assoc., 308 Minn. 255, 248 N.W.2d 279 (1976) (statute inapplicable to claims by owner of
real property against those who contracted with such owner for design and construction of an
improvement to the realty); Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (Ct. App. 1977), cert.
denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977) (statute applied to claims against the defendant as in-
staller of glass but not to claims against the defendant as manufacturer or seller of glass).
167. See Wilson v. Dake Corp., 497 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (action had to be brought
within ten years of first purchase for use or consumption, regardless of any duty to warn or
to provide updated safety instructions or devices; applying Tennessee law).
168. See DeLay v. Marathon LeTourneau Sales & Serv. Co., 48 Or. App. 811, 618 P.2d 11
(1980), aff'd 630 P.2d 836 (insanity caused by the accident for which suit was brought would
not toll statute of repose, though it might have tolled regular statute of limitations).
169. See Dortch v. A.H. Robins Co., 59 Or. App. 310, 650 P.2d 1046 (1982) (cause of action
against manufacturer of intrauterine contraceptive device would accrue when physical injury
occurred and the defendant was recognized as the source of the harm; but the action would
be barred by the statute of repose if no action accrued within its eight-year period).
170. See Ford Motor Co. v. Broadway, 374 So. 2d 207 (Miss. 1979) (in strict liability action
against manufacturer and seller of tractor, ten years' use without incident indicates that defect
did not exist at time of sale).
171. See Murphree v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 696 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1982) (upholding
and applying statutory amendment excluding asbestos-related disease actions from statute of repose;
applying Tennessee law).
172. See Annot., 25 A.L.R. 4th 641 (1983). See generally McGovern, supra note 33.
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guarantees of unrestricted access to courts, of due process, and of equal
protection.
Authority dealing with the access-to-courts guarantee has generally found
no denial of constitutional rights. Illinois has sustained such a statute against
the "access" argument even where this had the effect of barring the claim
of a minor.' It has been said that no one has a vested right in the common
law rules on causes of action and that the legislature is thus free to modify
or abolish those rules."' Florida upheld a statute of repose as applied to a
claim that had accrued prior to the operative date of the legislation, where
the statute gave a grace period in which the action could still have been brought
even though the statute was in effect.'" The court reasoned that the time
in which the action could be brought was shortened but the action was not
abolished. But in cases in which an action has been found completely barred
by a fixed period of limitation from the date of sale, Florida has ruled this
a violation of its constitutional provision guaranteeing access to the courts
to all persons for the redress of any injury. " 6 Thus, in one case a Florida
court allowed an action brought twenty-three years after delivery to the original
purchaser, reasoning that when the access-to-courts provision of the state con-
stitution was adopted, the theories of recovery for negligence, warranty, and
strict liability all were in existence and that the provision therefore protected
the plaintiff's rights to bring actions on these theories.'"
7
Statutes of repose were upheld against a due process attack in the same
Illinois'" and Indiana' 79 cases that sustained those statutes against the access-
to-courts argument. The Illinois court here faced a contention that the legisla-
tion was arbitrary because it applied only to actions based on strict liability
in tort, not those grounded in negligence or warranty. The court rejected this
argument on the basis of the heavier burden placed on sellers by strict tort
liability, i.e., plaintiffs need not show lack of due care, nor are they bound
by privity limitations. The court also rejected the argument that due process
was violated because the statute barred actions for injuries even before the
injuries had occurred, noting that the statute did not affect rights existing
173. Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 II1. App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522 (1981).
174. Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 513 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Ind. 1980), certified question
answered, 275 Ind. 520, 418 N.E.2d 207 (1981) (plaintiff not in position of having had vested
right taken from her since her cause of action had not yet accrued when statute of repose became
effective).
175. Purk v. Federal Press Co., 387 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1980).
176. Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981), on remand, 399 So.
2d 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla.
1980). Cf. Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979) (statutory ban on lawsuits
brought more than twelve years after improvements made to realty violated constitutional provi-
sion on access to courts since it abolished common law and statutory right of action and was
not based on an overpowering public necessity without any less onerous alternative).
177. Ellison v. Northwest Eng'g Co., 521 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (applying Florida law).
178. Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 II!. App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522 (1981). See Bates
v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 108 I11. App. 3d 137, 438 N.E.2d 1250 (1982).
179. Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 513 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
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when it came into operation. In a federal case applying Tennessee law,' 0 the
court also found no due process violation, reasoning that the huge increase
in defective product claims made liability insurance for sellers very expensive
and thus resulted in discouraging the production and sale of many products.
The court concluded that the statute had been enacted for good reason and
was not arbitrary. However, authority exists in North Carolina that legisla-
tion barring a hearing and remedy for injury after its infliction is similar to
the infliction of punishment before or without a hearing, and that a statute
of repose is thus on its face a denial of due process.'"' As the court there
observed, there is considerable authority to the same effect invalidating legisla-
tion setting a fixed cutoff date as to claims against architects and building
contractors.'2
There is not yet a great deal of authority on equal protection arguments.
Florida'83 and Indiana 8 " cases have rejected this line of attack, finding the
legislation to have a rational connection with a proper state objective. In light
of the increasing number of products claims and the need to protect liability
insurance companies, the Indiana court reasoned that any classification created
by the statute was rational. New Hampshire, however, has invalidated a statute
of repose as creating arbitrary categories of plaintiffs.' 85
Occasionally, various other lines of attack are mounted against statutes of
repose, as in a federal case from Connecticut where the court invalidated such
a statute on the ground it amended a statute of limitation so as to bar accrued
causes of action not barred by the previous statute without providing a grace
period. 8 6 In a federal case in Illinois, the defendants argued that the relevant
statute of repose was the misguided result of intensive lobbying by the in-
surance industry.'87 The court, however, found that this argument provided
no justification for overturning the judgment of the legislature.
Courts will normally reject a construction of a statute of repose that would
result in its merely providing an alternative period of limitation, in addition
to the regular statute of limitation, rather than its setting an absolute cutoff
180. Hawkins v. D & J Press Co., 527 F. Supp. 386 (E.D. Tenn. 1981).
181. Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981), modified
on other grounds, 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415 (1982) (the statute was not a statute of limita-
tions, which cannot begin to run until plaintiff is entitled to institute an action when the alleged
wrong has been completed).
182. See Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973); Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill.
2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967); Loyal Order of Moose v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977).
But see Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976); Hill v. Forrest & Cotton,
Inc., 555 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), upholding such statutes. See generally Comment,
18 CATH. U.L. REv. 361 (1969); Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 1242 (1979).
183. Purk v. Federal Press Co., 387 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1980).
184. Dague v. Piper Aircraft, 513 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
185. Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983) (statute impermissibly
discriminates between those injured by defective products and those injured in other ways).
186. Ferguson v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 524 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Conn. 1981) (court said that
presence of grace period would save statute from being unconstitutional).
187. Kline v. J.I. Case Co., 520 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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date measured from the time of sale.' 88 Some courts have thought the "alter-
native" interpretation would fly in the face of the clear legislative intent to
place some absolute limit on the time within which sellers can be held liable. 89
One federal court interpreted Tennessedstatutes that provided an action must
be brought within six years from date of injury and in any event must be
brought within ten years of the anticipated life of the product, whichever was
shorter.'" The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the legislation
established three separate periods of limitation, the longest of which would
apply. 9 On the other hand, under some circumstances courts may accord
a liberal, not literal, interpretation to statutes of repose in order to preserve
causes of action. This is accomplished by applying the period of repose to
the time between first purchase and injury, not the time between first pur-
chase and filing of suit. For example, an Oregon case dealt with an eight-year
statute of repose and a basic two-year statute of limitation.192 Plaintiff was
injured toward the end of the eight-year period and filed her complaint less
than two years afterward. By the time she filed, however, the eight-year period
of repose had expired. The plaintiff was nonetheless allowed to bring the
action, the court finding that a strict construction would produce an
unreasonable result. Statutes of repose also often do not deprive minors or
incompetents of the grace period they are ordinarily given under other statutes
for bringing their actions within a certain time of their attaining majority
or mental competence.'
g
Statutes of repose are certainly more extreme in operation, hence more con-
troversial, than ordinary statutes of limitation. Unlike the latter, they can
have the effect of barring a lawsuit before its cause of action has accrued. 94
Pressure to adopt or retain them will undoubtedly continue as the creation
of strict tort liability in the products field and the abolition of the privity
requirement have increased the possibility of potential liability arising long
after a product has been sold.I9S Repose statutes do not actually eliminate
the possibility of successful actions brought long after the initial sale since
these statutes do not necessarily apply to negligence actions. But in some
jurisdictions, they do so apply; and in any case, the difficulty of proving
188. See Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 513 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
189. Amermac, Inc. v. Gordon, 182 Ind. App. 116, 394 N.E.2d 946, 948 n.4 (1979).
190. Hinton v. Tennessee River Pulp& Paper Co., 510 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (apply-
ing Tennessee law).
191. Id. at 182.
192. Baird v. Electro Mart Factory Direct, Inc., 47 Or. App. 565, 615 P.2d 335 (1980).
193. See Tate v. Eli Lilly & Co., 522 F. Supp. 1048 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (applying Tennessee
law). But see DeLay v. Marathon LeTourneau Sales & Serv. Co., 48 Or. App. 811, 618 P:2d
11 (1980) (statute of repose not tolled by plaintiff's insanity). Cf. Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co.,
99 I1. App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522 (1981).
194. See McGovern, supra note 33, distinguishing statutes of limitation and statutes of repose.
195. See Turner, The Counter-Attack to Retake the Citadel Continues: An Analysis of the
Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose in Products Liability, 46 J. AIR L. & CoM. 449 (1981);
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negligence (especially many years after the fact) tends to limit the use of that
theory. It has been hoped that repose legislation will result in substantial lower-
ing of product liability insurance rates.'9 One commentator has expressed
doubts that this sort of legislation has any significant impact on insurance
costs, while noting that it may bar meritorious claims.' 97
Apart from the "insurance argument," statutes of repose do have their
advantages'9 8 : by allowing potential defendants to plan ahead with more cer-
tainty, these statutes promote accuracy in determining the cost of potential
liability; they eliminate evidentiary problems that would otherwise arise in
suits brought years after sale of a product; and they reflect the conviction
that long use of a product without incident is a strong indication the product
was not initially defective. Since these statutes do occasionally have disastrous
effects on meritorious claims, there has inevitably been some attempt to aid
potential defendants and lower their insurance costs by a less extreme method.
Among the alternatives suggested are the establishing of a useful safe life for
each product, after which the seller would not be liable for harm caused
thereby, and allowing manufacturers the total defense that a product reflected
the state of the art when that product was produced.199 The Model Uniform
Product Liability Act adopts the "useful life" suggestion, though the Act
couches it in terms of a presumption that does not arise in certain situations
and that, in any case, may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
20 0
Conclusion
Statutes of repose surely run counter to the prevailing perception in the
law that an action should not be barred prior to its accrual, or indeed prior
to the time that the underlying injury was discovered. There is inherent un-
fairness in eliminating a plaintiff's cause of action before it arises. The grounds
asserted in support of such statutes seem to be aimed at reducing the costs
and inconvenience of sellers. Conceivably, this could aid prospective plain-
tiffs, and all society, by keeping those sellers solvent. However, the "delay"
situation is only a small part of the problem faced by sellers who, even where
a statute of repose is adopted, may still incur large liability in cases that quickly
arise and are promptly litigated. It remains to be established that the allevia-
tion of sellers' cost resulting from statutes of repose is worth so drastic a
change in fundamental tort law.
A less drastic change, which would keep tort law intact and would also
provide symmetry for all personal injury and property damage claims brought
due to allegedly defective products, would be the elimination of the warranty
statute of limitations as an alternative to the tort statute. Since the warranty
statute is longer than the tort statute in absolute length (though not always
196. See Comment, supra note 195.
197. See Turner, supra note 196, at 459-60.
198. Id. at 458-59.
199. Id. at 479.
200. MODEL U~n. PRODUCTS LmBrmru ACT, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,732 (1979), reprinted in Turner,
supra note 196, at 457 n.57, discussed in McGovern, supra note 33, at 426-27.
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in application to a particular case), the elimination of this statute in tort cases
would give sellers some degree of relief. More important, those courts that
have adopted this approach treat all tort actions the same regardless of the
caption of the complaint. The applicable law depends on the nature of the
injury, not the legal theory for relief. The chief objection to this approach
is that it ignores the existence of the Uniform Commercial Code and the literal
application of its terms, as well as the application intended by its drafters
to tort cases, at least where there is privity between the parties. But the Code's
warranty statute, with its possible requirement of privity and its limitation
period measured from the date of sale, is a throwback to days when tort
law had not developed an effective remedy for product claims. If the "fall
of the citadel" of privity is now complete in tort law, 203 strict tort recovery
can provide an adequate remedy throughout the field of defective product
litigation. Retaining a possible remedy under the Uniform Commercial Code
merely promotes lack of uniformity, since it leads to a different treatment
of identical causes of action depending on whether they are brought under
a tort or a warranty theory. It also leads to a resurrection, for statute-of-
limitations purposes, of the old distinction, now rejected as irrelevant in other
contexts, between privity and nonprivity situations. The intent of the Code's
drafters may indeed have been to cover tort as well as commercial losses.
Courts today should look to the rationale behind that intent-the need to
provide an effective remedy not then available in tort. The common law of
tort has grown, and that gap no longer exists. Surely, policy based upon a
now abolished shortcoming should not be allowed to prevail over the primary
intent behind the Code-establishing uniform treatment of similar causes of
action. Where tort injury-personal harm or property damage-is alleged,
the tort statute of limitations should be the only applicable limitation statute.
201. As described in Prosser, supra note 135. See Miller, supra note 136, at 412-13 & n.6.
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